A Localist\u27s Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy by Parlow, Matthew
Marquette University Law School
Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2007
A Localist's Case for Decentralizing Immigration
Policy
Matthew Parlow
Marquette University Law School, matthew.parlow@marquette.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Matthew Parlow, A Localist's Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1061
(2007)
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Parlow, Matthew, "A Localist's Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy" (2007). Faculty Publications. Paper 485.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/485
1061 
A LOCALIST’S CASE FOR DECENTRALIZING IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 
MATTHEW PARLOW† 
INTRODUCTION 
Illegal immigration1 has once again captured political discourse.  In 
fact, many believe that political candidates’ stances on illegal immigra-
tion will play a major role in determining the 2008 presidential and con-
gressional elections.  Divergent viewpoints in the illegal immigration 
debate argue vigorously about the economic, social, and political effects 
of undocumented immigrants.2  But both sides seem to agree on one 
premise:  that the current federal immigration system is broken.   
Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that both state and local govern-
ments3 have attempted to supplement federal illegal immigration efforts.  
Recently, many local governments have considered and/or adopted ordi-
nances aimed at addressing undocumented immigrants within their re-
spective boundaries.4  These laws have been met by fierce opposition, 
with claims of unconstitutionality and preemption.  Yet the local gov-
ernment foray into this public-policy arena raises an important theoreti-
cal and practical question about what role, if any, local governments 
should play in regulating illegal immigration.   
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the circumstances 
facing the federal government in crafting and enforcing its immigration 
laws and policies.  Part II explores four primary types of local illegal 
immigration laws—housing, employment, day laborer, and English-only 
ordinances—and the constitutional and legal issues surrounding them.  
Part III discusses local governments’ ability or inability to enforce, or 
refuse to enforce, federal immigration laws.  Some cities seem to be neu-
  
 † Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law.  J.D., Yale Law School; 
B.A., Loyola Marymount University.  I am grateful to Professors Marisa Cianciarulo, Ernesto Her-
nandez, Scott Johns, and Janine Kim for their thoughts on this article; to Larissa Branes for her 
research assistance; to Jack Hobaugh and the editors of the Denver University Law Review for invit-
ing me to participate in this Symposium and for their research and editing assistance; and to Chap-
man University School of Law for its financial support. 
 1. In this article, I use the term “illegal immigration” to refer to the phenomenon of persons 
entering the United States illegally—as defined by our federal immigration laws—or who remain in 
the country illegally after their permitted period of time to be lawfully present has expired.   
 2. In this article, I use the term “undocumented immigrant” to refer to a person who enters 
the United States illegally—as defined by our federal immigration laws—or who remains in the 
country illegally after his/her permitted period of time to be lawfully present has expired.  Others 
refer to such individuals as “illegal aliens,” as do our federal immigrations laws. 
 3. In this article, I use the term local governments, cities, counties, and localities inter-
changeably and broadly to refer to local government entities.   
 4. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. 
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tral towards, if not supportive of, undocumented immigrants: these sanc-
tuary cities refuse to enforce federal immigration laws.  Other cities ac-
tively seek to enforce federal immigration laws.  However, both ap-
proaches face constitutional and legal hurdles.  Part IV questions whether 
the current constitutional and legal landscape where local governments 
are preempted in the area of immigration regulation is wise or desirable.  
By highlighting the values of federalism and localism, this section makes 
the case for why local governments should be able to regulate in the im-
migration arena and supplement—but not conflict with—federal efforts.     
I.  BACKGROUND 
Scholarly and political views on this imbalance and illegal immigra-
tion generally vary dramatically.  Some claim that illegal immigration 
and what is perceived as inadequate federal enforcement pose a threat to 
national security and the current war on terror.5  Others argue that un-
documented immigrants cause many social and economic problems, such 
as serving as a drain on social-service provisions at the federal, state, and 
local level.6  On the other side of the spectrum, some argue that undocu-
mented immigrants contribute more in taxes and economic stimulus than 
they deplete in governmental resources.7   
Public-opinion polls demonstrate that a majority of Americans con-
sider illegal immigration to be a serious problem.8  The federal govern-
ment’s inability to enforce immigration laws may help shape this percep-
tion.  An estimated eight to twelve million undocumented immigrants 
live in the United States, with hundreds of thousands more adding to that 
number each year.9  This figure constitutes approximately four percent of 
the United States population and is more than double the number of un-
documented immigrants in the country a decade ago.10  The United 
States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is 
charged with enforcing our nation’s immigration laws, including remov-
ing undocumented immigrants.11  However, while it has more than 
  
 5. See, e.g., Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local Law 
Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 324-33 (2005). 
 6. See, e.g., Laurel R. Boatright, Note, “Clear Eye for the State Guy”:  Clarifying Authority 
and Trusting Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement, 84 TEX. 
L. REV. 1633, 1639-43 (2006). 
 7. See Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, 
and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 1-8 (2006). 
 8. See Joseph Chamie, Center for Migration Studies, Presentation at the Population Associa-
tion of America Annual Meeting:  What About Illegal Aliens? 4-6 (Mar. 30, 2006), available at 
http://paa2006.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=60186 (citing various public opinion 
polls).   
 9. See Daniel Booth, Note, Federalism on Ice: State and Local Enforcement of Federal 
Immigration Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1063, 1065 n.15 (2006) (citing 151 CONG. REC. 
S7852 (daily ed. June 30, 2005)).   
 10. See Chamie, supra note 8, at 2.  
 11. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of 
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 180 n.5 (2005).   
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17,000 employees, ICE only has approximately 2,000 immigration en-
forcement agents.12  Perhaps in response to this seemingly pervasive sen-
timent and the perceived inadequacies of the federal response to illegal 
immigration, local governments—as discussed further below—have at-
tempted to fill this void through their own local initiatives.  With more 
than 800,000 state and local law enforcement officers nationwide, there 
appears to be an untapped potential for further collaboration and coordi-
nation in immigration enforcement.13 
II.  LOCAL ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ORDINANCES 
The first city to experiment with local illegal immigration laws was 
the City of San Bernardino, California.14  In the spring of 2006, a group 
called “Save Our State” proposed an illegal immigration ordinance and 
requested that the San Bernardino City Council place the measure on the 
ballot for the November 2006 election.15  The proposed “City of San 
Bernardino Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance” sought to regulate 
the activities of day laborers; penalize businesses that employed un-
documented immigrants; prohibit renting property to undocumented im-
migrants; and mandate that all city business be conducted in English 
only.16  The San Bernardino City Council voted 4-3 against adopting the 
ordinance or placing it on the ballot for voter consideration.17  In July 
2006, the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, became the first locality to 
adopt an illegal immigration ordinance when it adopted the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform Act Ordinance, which was modeled after the San Ber-
nardino ordinance.18  The Mayor of Hazleton, Lou Baletta, sponsored the 
proposed ordinance, claiming that such a measure was necessary to ad-
  
 12. See id. at 180.   
 13. See id. at 181. 
 14. See San Bernardino, Cal., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance §§ 4-8 (Sept. 2006) 
[hereinafter San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance], available at http://www.campaignsite 
builder.com/templates/displayfiles/tmpl68.asp?SiteID=843&PageID=12139&Trial=false.   
 15. See Chris Richard, Proposed Immigration Relief Act Ordinance Brings Turmoil, 
RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, May 8, 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.saveourstate.org/vforums/archive/index.php/t-11066.html.      
 16. See San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra note 14, §§ 4-8. 
 17. See Booyeon Lee, Escondido to Look at Housing Ordinance: Illegal Immigrants Focus of 
Proposal, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 2006, at N1, available at 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060813/news_1mi13imrent.html. 
 18. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, §§ 4-5 (proposed Sept. 2006) [hereinafter Hazleton 
Ordinance 2006-18], available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-
18%20_Illegal%20Alien%20Immigration%20Relief%20Act.pdf;  see also Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 
2006-13 (proposed Sept. 2006) [hereinafter Hazleton Ordinance 2006-13], available at 
http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-13%20_Landlord%20Tenant%20Ordinance.pdf 
(prohibiting renting to undocumented immigrants); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (2006) [here-
inafter Hazleton Ordinance 2006-19], available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/ 
2006-19%20_Official%20English.pdf (requiring that all city business be conducted in English only, 
with some limited exceptions).    
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dress crime committed by undocumented immigrants in the City and the 
economic drain illegal immigration had on City services.19   
The trailblazing efforts by the cities of San Bernardino and Hazle-
ton spurred a flurry of local activity in the immigration realm.  In fact, 
during the past year, approximately one hundred cities or counties in 
twenty-five states have adopted and/or considered ordinances aimed at 
addressing illegal immigration within their respective boundaries.20  
There are four main types of these ordinances: employment, day laborer, 
housing, and English-only.21  Some of them mimic federal laws, while 
others go farther than federal immigration laws.   
The first type of illegal immigration ordinances are the employment 
ordinances.  These laws seek to punish businesses that employ undocu-
mented immigrants.  Some of these laws impose fines on such busi-
nesses,22 while others withhold businesses license from, and/or revoke 
city contracts with, businesses that employ undocumented immigrants.23  
Many of these employment ordinances impose an affirmative duty on 
businesses within their respective jurisdiction to verify the lawful resi-
dency and/or immigration documentation of their employees.24   
A second type of employment ordinances are the day laborer ordi-
nances.  These laws do not prohibit employment of undocumented im-
migrants, but instead require those who hire day laborers to register with 
the city and display a certificate in their car windows.25  Other cities have 
sought to deal with day laborers directly by severely restricting the ac-
tivities and availability of day laborers within their boundaries.26   
The housing ordinances may be the most controversial of the illegal 
immigration ordinances.  These measures prohibit landlords from renting 
  
 19. See Welcome to Small Town Defenders, http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/public/ 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2007).    
 20. See Database of Local Immigration Ordinances, http://www.fairimmigration.org/learn/ 
immigration-reform-and-immigrants/local-level/database-of-ordinances.html (last visited Apr. 9, 
2007); see also Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, http://www.prldef.org/Civil/ 
Latino%20Justice%20Campaign.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
 21. Some cities have adopted and/or considered ordinances that incorporate all four of these 
areas, as San Bernardino proposed.  See, e.g., San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra 
note 14, §§ 4-8. Other cities, such as Hazleton, have adopted and/or considered such measures 
through several ordinances.  See Hazleton Ordinance 2006-13, 2006-18, 2006-19, supra note 18; see 
also Database of Local Immigration Ordinances, supra note 20 (noting the type of illegal immigra-
tion ordinance that each city proposed and/or adopted).  
 22. See, e.g., San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra note 14, § 4.   
 23. See, e.g., Riverside Township, N.J., Ordinance 2006-16, § 4 (2006), available at 
http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Documents/Riverside%20Ordin%2016%20&%2018%20Passed%207-
06.pdf.   
 24. See, e.g., Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 2025-2006, § 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Documents/Suffolk%20County.pdf.   
 25. See, e.g., Vista, Cal., Ordinance 2006-9, § 5.90.030 (2006), available at 
http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Documents/Vista,%20CA%20Ordinance.pdf.   
 26. See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (noting how the Village limited where day laborers could congregate and launched a law 
enforcement campaign to reduce the number of day laborers within the jurisdiction). 
2007] A LOCALIST'S CASE 1065 
to undocumented immigrants and impose severe penalties for doing so, 
such as a $1,000 per day fine.27  Some of these housing ordinances even 
go so far as to require landlords to verify the legal resident status of their 
tenants—a very controversial aspect of these laws.28   
Finally, there are the English-only ordinances.  These laws establish 
English as the official language of the city and require that all city de-
partments conduct business in English.29  Cities with these laws do pro-
vide for certain limited exceptions when language other than English 
may be spoken by city employees when conducting official business.30  
While these English-only ordinances may not appear to target illegal 
immigration at first glance, they are intended—at least in part—to dis-
courage undocumented immigrants from availing themselves of social 
services provided by the particular locality. 
These recent local illegal immigration ordinances raise many consti-
tutional and legal questions.  The United States Constitution designates 
immigration as a federal prerogative, giving Congress the power “[t]o 
establish a uniform rule of naturalization” for the country.31  Thus, most 
courts considering challenges to these local laws have invalidated or en-
joined them pursuant to the Supremacy Clause32 of the United States 
Constitution.33  On one hand, these results are consistent with United 
States Supreme Court precedent holding that the federal government has 
exclusive powers over immigration matters, thus preempting state and 
  
 27. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-18, supra note 18, § 5 (“It is unlawful for any person 
or business entity that owns a dwelling unit in the City to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit, 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the 
United States in violation of law, unless such harboring is otherwise expressly permitted by federal 
law.”); Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38R, § 3 (2006), available at http://aclusandiego.org/ 
pdf/EscondidoOrdinance110306.pdf; Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance BL2006-1234 § 6.30.020 (2006), 
available at http://www.nashville.gov/mc/ordinances/bl2006_1234.htm; Valley Park, Mo., Ordi-
nance 1708 § 3 (2006), available at http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Documents/valley%20park%20 
ordinance.pdf.   
 28. See Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance 2006-003, § 3, available at 
http://www.cherokeega.com/departments/boc/Harboring%20Illegal%20Aliens%20Ordinance.pdf.   
 29. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-19, supra note 18, § 3; Farmers Branch, Tex., Resolu-
tion 2006-130, § 2, available at http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/Communication/Resolution% 
202006-130.html; Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance 2006-004 § 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.cherokeega.com/departments/boc/English%20Language%20Ordinance.pdf.   
 30. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-19, supra note 18, § 4 (providing exceptions to teach 
English to non-English speakers or to protect public health or safety, among others). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.”).   
 33. See, e.g., Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802U (Cir. Ct. St. Louis County, 
Mo. Sept. 27, 2006) (granting and amending a temporary restraining order), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/valleypark_amendedtro.pdf (enjoining the City from enforcing 
its illegal immigration ordinance because of the likelihood that it is preempted by federal law); 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 3:06cv1586, at 9-10 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2006) (granting a temporary 
restraining order) (finding that it is reasonably likely that two of Hazleton’s illegal immigration 
ordinances violate the Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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local regulation in the area.34  For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz,35 the 
Supreme Court considered a Pennsylvania law that required aliens to 
register with, and receive a registration card from, the State.36  The Court 
struck down the law as preempted, stating that immigration regulation is 
intertwined with international policy that is recognized as an exclusive 
federal power.37   
On the other hand, in Hines, the Supreme Court oddly left open the 
door to state—and by extension, local government—regulation in the 
immigration field by stating that “[a]ny concurrent state power that may 
exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits.”38  Similarly, despite stating 
that regulating immigration was an exclusively federal power, the Su-
preme Court in DeCanas v. Bica,39 held that a California labor law that 
prohibited employers from hiring aliens not entitled to residence within 
the United States was not preempted by federal immigration law.40  The 
Court stated that “the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does 
not render it a regulation of immigration.”41  In fact, the Court noted that 
federal immigration laws and corresponding legislative history indicated 
that Congress intended for states to regulate the employment of undocu-
mented immigrants.42  Accordingly, the Court found the law to be a valid 
exercise of police power regarding employment issues in the state.43   
Courts have also found that these local illegal immigration ordi-
nances may violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.44  Moreover, the Fair Housing Act—which pro-
hibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, and other 
characteristics—may also provide a valid basis for challenging the illegal 
immigration housing ordinances.45  Nevertheless, as mentioned above, 
most courts have found state and local laws aimed at addressing illegal 
immigration to be preempted by federal law.46   
  
 34. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1976) (stating that regulating immigration is 
an exclusive federal power). 
 35. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).   
 36. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 59. 
 37. See id. at 66-67.   
 38. Id. at 68. 
 39. 424 U.S. 351. 
 40. Id. at 365. 
 41. Id. at 355.   
 42. Id. at 361. 
 43. Id. at 356-57.   
 44. See, e.g., Lozano, No. 3:06cv1586, at 9-10 (granting a temporary restraining order based 
on the likelihood that the two of Hazleton’s illegal immigration ordinances violate the Supremacy 
Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Vill. of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 547 (finding equal protection 
violations stemming from the Village’s regulation of day laborers). 
 45. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 3601-19. 
 46. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Barrientos, No. 06-1726 (D. La. Jan. 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/organizationsORG/NILC/images/020107%20Barrientos%20
decision.pdf (ruling that the Louisiana statute prohibiting driving without lawful presence in the 
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III.  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL 
IMMIGRATION LAWS 
Not all local governments have taken anti-illegal immigration ap-
proaches.47  In fact, many cities have passed sanctuary—or non-
cooperation—laws that designate their respective boundaries as safe-
havens for undocumented immigrants.48  By designating itself as a sanc-
tuary city, a locality adopts a policy that prevents its employees from 
enforcing federal immigration laws or coordinating with immigration 
enforcement.49  While such local government policies have not been in-
validated to date, federal law provides some limitations to these sanctu-
ary laws.   
Two federal laws adopted in 1996—the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) and the Welfare Reform 
Act—prohibit local governments from preventing their employees from 
voluntarily reporting the immigration status of an individual to federal 
authorities.50  These federal laws do not mandate that local governments 
report undocumented immigrants to federal officials, but rather require 
that cities do not restrict their employees from voluntarily reporting such 
individuals to immigration agents.51 
Recently, Congress has twice sought to provide disincentives for 
cities to designate themselves as sanctuaries for undocumented immi-
grants.  In 2003, and again in 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives 
introduced the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act 
(“CLEAR Act”),52 and the U.S. Senate considered the Homeland Secu-
rity Enhancement Act (“HSEA”).53  Both bills emphasized that state and 
local governments were entitled to support the federal government in 
enforcing immigration laws.54  The CLEAR Act proposed denying cer-
tain federal funds to state or local governments that “ha[ve] in effect a 
statute, policy, or practice that prohibits law enforcement officers . . . 
from assisting or cooperating with Federal immigration law enforce-
  
United States—the “driving while illegal” law—is “an impermissible attempt to regulate immigra-
tion and conflicts with federal immigration law”).   
 47. For example, many cities have passed resolutions of support for bi-partisan, comprehen-
sive immigration reform.  See Database of Local Immigration Ordinances, supra note 20.  The City 
of Boston, Massachusetts even passed a resolution supporting resident status for undocumented 
immigrants currently in the United States.  Id. 
 48. See id. (noting cities that have designated themselves as sanctuary cities). 
 49. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the 
Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1382-84 (2006). 
 50. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1644 (West 2007).  Section 434 of the Welfare Reform Act provides 
that:  “[N]o State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from send-
ing to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the im-
migration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.  See id.  Section 642 of IIRIRA 
prohibits essentially the same.  See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373. 
 51. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1644, 1373. 
 52. H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 53. S. 1906, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1362, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 54. H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); S. 1362, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005). 
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ment.”55  However, Congress never passed either the CLEAR Act or the 
HSEA.56   
Other local governments have actively sought to enforce federal 
immigration laws.  Unsurprisingly, legal issues arise as to what types of 
immigration laws cities may enforce—civil immigration laws (such as 
being present in the United States without authorization) and/or criminal 
immigration laws (like crossing the border without inspection).57  Courts 
have consistently upheld state and local government enforcement of fed-
eral criminal immigration laws.58  However, there seems to be a circuit 
split as to whether state and local governments may enforce federal civil 
immigration laws.59 
In Gonzalez v. City of Peoria,60 a group of Mexican-American citi-
zens challenged the City’s policy of having its police officers arrest and 
detain aliens suspected of illegally entering the United States, a federal 
criminal immigration violation.61  The Ninth Circuit held for the City 
based on the established precedent that states and local governments can 
enforce federal criminal immigrations statutes.62  However, the court 
expressed doubt—in dicta—as to whether states and local governments 
could enforce federal civil immigration statutes.63  The Ninth Circuit 
posited that because Congress enacted a “pervasive regulatory scheme” 
regarding immigrant entry, resident status, and deportation, it had re-
served exclusive federal control over civil immigration laws and thus 
preempted state and local government efforts in that field.64   
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, have held other-
wise.  In Lynch v. Cannatella,65 the Fifth Circuit addressed whether fed-
eral law constituted the sole manner for detaining sixteen Jamaican stow-
aways who were held by the Port of New Orleans Harbor Police after 
  
 55. H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2005). 
 56. The CLEAR Act was introduced again in the current session.  See H.R. 842, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
 57. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 976-77 
(2004). 
 58. See Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983); Lynch v. Cannatella, 
810 F.2d 1363, 1371 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th 
Cir. 1999); see also Pham, supra note 57, at 977-78 (detailing why local governments have been 
allowed to enforce federal criminal immigration laws under traditional preemption analysis).    
 59. Scholars are similarly split on this topic as well.  See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and 
Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1089-90 (2004) (argu-
ing that the breadth of federal civil immigration law demonstrates Congress’ intent to fully occupy 
the policy field and thus preempt state and local governments from enforcing such laws); Kobach, 
supra note 11, at 199-219 (arguing that state and local governments have the inherent authority to 
enforce federal civil immigration laws and that Congress has not preempted this policy field). 
 60. 722 F.2d 468. 
 61. Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 472-73. 
 62. Id. at 474-75. 
 63. Id. at 474-77.  
 64. Id.  
 65. 810 F.2d 1363. 
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their discovery.66  The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion was unequivocal and 
validated the inherent authority of state and local governments to enforce 
federal civil immigration laws: “No statute precludes other federal, state, 
or local law enforcement agencies from taking other action to enforce 
this nation’s immigration laws.”67  In United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez,68 
the Tenth Circuit considered an undocumented immigrant’s claim that 
his arrest by an Oklahoma police officer—based solely on his illegal 
presence in the United States—was not permitted by federal law.69  The 
Tenth Circuit rejected the appellant’s argument finding a variety of fed-
eral statutes that demonstrated that Congress did not intend to preempt 
state and local government enforcement of federal criminal and civil 
immigration laws.70 
The United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) has also been 
of two minds on this point.  Prior to 2002, the DOJ’s position was that 
state and local governments could not enforce federal civil immigration 
laws.71  However, in 2002, the DOJ reversed itself, stating that state and 
local governments have inherent authority as sovereigns to enforce these 
federal laws.72  Nevertheless, to hedge its bets—and to be proactive in 
engaging state and local governments in coordinating with federal offi-
cials in immigration enforcement—the DOJ entered into memoranda of 
understanding (“MOU”) with states and cities to enforce federal civil 
immigration laws.73   
IV.  PREEMPTION, FEDERALISM, AND THE LOCALIST’S CASE 
Whether a local government adopts an illegal immigration ordi-
nance, designates itself a sanctuary city, or enforces federal civil immi-
gration laws, the issue of federal preemption looms large.  Yet one has to 
ask the question of whether such a stringent preemption position makes 
sense and is desirable.  The preemption doctrine stems from principles of 
federalism.74  Federalism is our intergovernmental system that allocates 
and disperses power between higher and lower levels of government.75  
  
 66. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1367. 
 67. Id. at 1371. 
 68. 176 F.3d 1294. 
 69. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1295-97. 
 70. Id. at 1300. 
 71. See Memorandum from Teresa Wynn Rosenborough, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
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In light of this system, the United States Supreme Court has crafted a test 
to determine if federal law preempts state and/or local law: express pre-
emption by Congress; field preemption if the federal statutory scheme is 
so pervasive that it leaves no room for state or local supplementing; and 
conflict preemption, where a state or local government permits some-
thing that federal law forbids or forbids something that federal law al-
lows.76  Federalism is also intended to serve a number of different val-
ues—innovation, democracy, accountability, and checking too much 
federal power.77  Local governments seem best suited to fulfill these val-
ues, both generally and specifically to immigration regulation and en-
forcement. 
In reflecting on federalism, Justice Brandeis once famously stated 
that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”78  If the fifty states serve as such laboratories, then certainly the 
tens of thousands of local governments nationwide offer enticing oppor-
tunities for experimentation and reform.  Local governments have proven 
to be incubators for innovative policies in a variety of areas: firearm 
regulation, gay and lesbian rights, domestic partnership laws, campaign 
finance reform, and living wage law.79  Therefore, local government ex-
perimentation in the immigration realm can lead to successes or failures 
that can inform federal policy-making. 
Local governments also advance the value of democracy by provid-
ing opportunities for public participation in their decision-making proc-
esses.80  The federal and state governments may have more resources at 
their disposal and have control over a broader range of policies than local 
governments, but these higher levels of government are too large and 
inaccessible for meaningful civic engagement.  Small governmental enti-
ties like cities thus invite a higher percentage of their respective constitu-
ency to deliberate directly over issues facing their communities because 
people find it easier to meet, share their opinions, and share the results of 
this dialogic process with their local elected officials.  Therefore, local 
governments are more in touch with their constituents and are thus able 
to be more responsive to the needs of their communities—whether 
friendly or hostile to undocumented immigrants.81  This, of course, is 
consistent with the Tenth Amendment, which charges state and local 
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governments with police power to regulate the health, safety, and general 
welfare of its citizens.82  Correspondingly, because of the close proximity 
to their local elected officials and administrators and the opportunity to 
be engaged in local government decision-making, community stake-
holders can better oversee the work of their local governments and thus 
hold them accountable.83  This dynamic in local government furthers the 
democratic and accountability ideals of federalism. 
Accordingly, it seems odd that traditional theories of federalism 
overlook local governments as facilitators of these federalism values 
with their focus on a two-tiered system of federal and state governments.  
Localists espouse a more modern view of federalism with local govern-
ments as quasi-sovereign governmental entities that constitute a third-
tier.84  The aforementioned emphasis on federal preemption of local gov-
ernment regulation and enforcement in the immigration field runs afoul 
of this modern view because preemption thwarts local experimentation 
and innovation in immigration reform.85  It also precludes localities from 
passing laws and enforcing federal civil immigration laws to further the 
health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.86  Indeed, different 
states and local governments are affected in drastically different man-
ners—both positively and negatively—by illegal immigration.87  Local 
governments should be able to respond accordingly, especially if the 
federal government is not meeting those communities’ needs.   
This argument does not derive from an anti-illegal immigration po-
sition.  In fact, calls for requiring local governments to enforce federal 
immigration laws are similarly untenable for a localist because this 
would constitute an unfunded mandate that undermines local autonomy 
and violates the Tenth Amendment.  It is important to recognize that 
there are multiple motivating factors for why localities would adopt the 
illegal immigration ordinances detailed above—some of them are no 
doubt unsavory.  But it is also plausible that cities have determined—
whether correctly or incorrectly—that illegal immigration negatively 
affects their communities and that the federal government is failing in its 
duties to enforce federal immigration laws in a manner that sufficiently 
protects their constituents.  If this is a factor, and we believe in the values 
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of federalism, then localities should have some recourse to address these 
perceived problems—something that the current preemption regime does 
not allow.88  This does not mean the cities should be able to enact laws 
that conflict with federal or state immigration laws.  Rather, under a con-
current powers doctrine and a modern theory of federalism, local gov-
ernment efforts in the immigration realm should stand unless they make 
legal something the federal government deems illegal or prohibit some-
thing that federal immigration laws permit.  In fact, one could read many 
of the local illegal immigration ordinances as making illegal through 
local laws that which is already illegal under federal immigration law. 
While this localist position may have some appeal, there is an un-
derstandable reticence for such local government regulation and en-
forcement in the immigration field.  One concern is that these local ordi-
nances will have impacts that extend beyond the undocumented immi-
grants they target.89  United States citizens and legally admitted aliens 
may have their civil rights violated by these ordinances.  Local police 
forces may engage in racial profiling and discrimination.  These concerns 
raise equal protection issues, which may wind up rendering some of 
these local illegal immigration ordinances unconstitutional—and rightly 
so.  However, even if these ordinances did not raise Equal Protection or 
Due Process concerns, they would be struck down under the current pre-
emption regime—thus precluding local government from supplementing 
federal immigration policy. 
There is also a concern that such ordinances are based on racial 
fears and stereotypes, not evidence of a threat to the health, safety, and 
welfare of the community.90  Moreover, local police forces may not be 
trained in immigration issues, thus causing a problem with enforcement.  
Further, an individual’s immigration status can change in a short period 
of time.  There is also a lack of an assured database to determine an indi-
vidual’s immigration status.  These training issues pose challenges, but 
none which are merely germane to local governments.  Cities ought to 
seek training—as evidenced by the MOUs with the DOJ—on immigra-
tion matters to be truly effective.  However, even if they do not, that con-
cern is not a valid basis for broadly preempting local action in the immi-
gration field. 
Others worry that local governments will divert valuable police time 
and resources away from every-day enforcement functions.91  Opponents 
also claim that undocumented immigrants will not trust local police 
forces and thus not come forward with critical information regarding 
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crimes for fear of being deported.92  These may be valid criticisms, but 
they are policy concerns that cities must grapple with in deciding how to 
expend their resources and where to target their focus—both in terms of 
regulation and enforcement.  While it would be an unfortunate conse-
quence to have undocumented immigrants distrust police and not volun-
tarily offer information on crimes, it is merely a consideration a city must 
weigh in deciding whether to adopt such illegal immigration positions.  
Moreover, as mentioned above, if constituents are unhappy with cities’ 
decisions to divert police time and resources to illegal immigration en-
forcement and away from normal public safety work, community mem-
bers are more likely to be able to hold their local government account-
able because of their smaller sizes.   
CONCLUSION 
Cities provide opportunities to test out many of the claims made by 
both sides of the illegal immigration debate.  A locality could adopt these 
illegal immigration ordinances and/or enforce federal criminal and civil 
immigration laws to see if expelling undocumented immigrants from 
their jurisdiction actually improved crime rates or stopped the perceived 
depletion of government social service resources.93  Or the local govern-
ment might find that such measures hurt the local economy through lost 
tax dollars and workforce.  In contrast, a city could designate itself a 
sanctuary city to see if maintaining its undocumented immigrant popula-
tion helps maintain a strong local economy.  The locality might instead 
experience an influx of undocumented immigrants that may have some 
unintended and undesirable consequences.  Such possibilities to test the 
rhetoric on both sides on a local level—and thus inform federal decision-
makers—through these innovative local efforts are currently largely pre-
cluded because of preemption.  As we grapple as a nation with this 
highly complex and divisive issue, we should not preempt and ignore 
local governments, as they provide opportunities for new, supplemental 
approaches to what is seen by both sides of the debate as a broken federal 
immigration policy. 
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